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I. Introduction 
 
 This paper studies some different reactions by foreign investors facing the 
financial crisis in Korean stock markets.  
Foreign investors, especially, non-resident foreign institutions, are known as 
more sophisticated than domestic investors; we are using the three kinds of foreign 
investor types – foreign resident individuals, foreign non-resident institutions, and 
foreign non-resident individuals. While many domestic individual investors have a 
strong propensity to hold onto depreciating stocks too long relative to what is optimal 
for expected utility maximization -- a behavioral pattern that has been dubbed as loss 
aversion, institutional or even sophisticated individual investors may do the reverse – 
to take advantage of tax loss selling or maybe to make a profit from contrarian 
strategy. This difference is potentially very important for understanding the 
implication of the loss aversion hypothesis for asset market equilibrium. 
 The loss aversion hypothesis, also called the “disposition effect” by Shefrin and 
Statman (1985), originates from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory: 
people act as if they maximize a value function that is defined not over wealth level, 
but over gains and losses1. 
 There are a number of studies that report evidence that individual investors 
exhibit aversion to realizing loss.  Using information on trades by a set of individual 
investors, and separate information on redemption of mutual funds by individual 
investors, Shefrin and Statman (1985) argue that their trading patterns are consistent 
with loss aversion.  In a very careful and innovative paper that uses trading records 
                                            
1 This value function increases in gains but decreases in losses, where gains and losses are measured 
relative to a reference point, typically status quo.  Most importantly, the value function is “S-shaped”: 
concave in the domain of gains but convex in the domain of losses.  It is also steeper for losses than 
for gains, which implies that any investor with such a value function would exhibit loss-aversion. 
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on 10,000 accounts from a discount brokerage house, Odean (1998) reports clear 
evidence that individual investors are less willing to sell depreciating stocks than 
appreciating ones. 
 In a representative investor model, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that loss 
aversion combined with annual performance review provide one explanation for the 
equity premium puzzle.  Barberis, Huang and Santos (1999) argue, again through a 
representative investor model, that loss aversion together with some additional 
assumptions not only help to explain the equity premium puzzle, but also can explain 
excessive volatility and mean reversion in stock prices.  Obviously, whether 
institutional and sophisticated individual investors also exhibit loss aversion could 
have important implications for these explanations.  First, institutional foreign 
investors have already accounted for 99.69 percent of the market (in the case of Korea 
Stock Exchange, See Table [1]), the loss aversion of individual investors have to a lot 
larger than these models have assumed in order to overcome the trading patterns of 
the institutional investors in order to have their psychological propensity to be 
reflected in the asset prices.  Second, knowing that individuals may exhibit loss 
aversion, managers of large funds may systematically exploit this (something that has 
been called “poaching” by Zeckhauser, etc.) 
 All of these studies look at the behavior of individual investors alone.  Because 
we do not directly observe the information set that the investors base their decisions 
on, it is possible that the tendency to sell less of the depreciating stocks in the sample 
can still be fully rational, i.e., not resulting from loss aversion.  For example, if 
investors anticipate an increase in capital gains tax in the near future, it would be 
rational for them to all chose to sell appreciating stocks now more than they otherwise 
would do.  This could generate the observation that realized gains are greater than 
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realized losses even without the loss aversion problem prescribed by the prospect 
theory. 
 In this paper, I tackle the problem from a new angle. The aim of this paper is 
threefold. First, I assume that prospect theory is about unsophisticated individual 
investors.  Hence, on a priori ground assuming prospect theory is correct, we would 
expect unsophisticated individuals to deviate from full rationality and exhibit loss 
aversion, whereas professional managers at the institutions (mutual funds, investment 
banks, etc) and even larger and more sophisticated individual investors should suffer 
less from the loss aversion tendency or not at all2. And also, during the financial crisis, 
the foreign institutions compared with unsophisticated individuals show even less loss 
aversion because realizing a loss is now no longer shameful. Investors can attribute 
their loss to crisis, and not to their poor investment skills. Second, we examined 
whether panic selling among the foreign investors actually occurred during the 
financial crisis in 1997. Third, I study whether the change of strategy (momentum or 
contrarian) was implemented by each of three investor types during crisis period.  
 I implement our idea by making use of a unique data set that details the end-of-
month positions in every Korea stock by every single foreign investor. A shortcoming 
of the data is that we only observe month-end positions rather than the actual 
transaction data3. But the data set also offers a great and unique advantage: it allows 
us to separate small individual (foreign) investors residing in Korea, from the large 
institutional investors and more sophisticated individuals from aboard.  We are not 
aware of any other paper in the literature that compares the trading patterns of 
                                            
2 Of course, professional fund managers could engage in other trading patterns in response to their 
incentive structure and constraints that may be “undesirable” from a society’s point of view.  One 
example is herding behavior.  See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Choe, Kho and Stulz 
(1998), and Kim and Wei (1999) for evidence on this. 
3 So there would be measurement errors in computing expected losses/gains associated with the 
changes in the positions as we cannot assign precise prices to the transactions. 
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sophisticated versus naïve investors from a common data source during a common 
sample period. Moreover, in Korea, the proportion of foreign investors is increasing 
during the period we collected. Figure [1] and Figure [2] show the increasing ratio of 
foreign investors and increasing market value of stocks foreign investors hold in the 
Korea Stock Exchange. 
I organize the paper as follows. Section II introduces related literatures. 
Section III, IV and V explains data, hypothesis and methodology. Empirical study will 
be analyzed in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper. 
 
 
Table [1] 
Type of Foreign Investors 
number of 
stocks(10,000) 
market value 
(100million won) 
ratio 
individuals 1320 2224 0.31 
institutions 168080 704319 99.69 
mutual funds and trust funds 96671 376065 53.23 
bank 33152 187371 26.52 
securities company 5491 18918 2.68 
pension funds 13899 57658 8.16 
insurance company 3974 17594 2.49 
others 14893 46713 6.61 
sum 169400 706543 100 
Financial Supervisory Service, 1999 
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Figure [1] 
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Figure [2] 
Market value of foreign investors holding stocks 
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II. Related Literatures Review 
 
1. Prospect Theory  
 
Prospect theory can be applied to the explanation of the disposition to sell 
winners too early and ride loser too long. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
(1979) proposed the value functions different from expected utility theory. 
Value function is defined on deviations from the reference point; generally concave 
for gains and commonly convex for losses; steeper for losses than for gains. [Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, P. 279] The proposed S-shaped value function explains 
why investors are reluctant to realize losses while they sell winners too soon.  
This value function can be easily applied into loss aversion among investors. 
When investors are facing gains, as the normally accepted utility theory suggested, 
they express risk averseness and sell the winning stocks too soon, on the other hand, if 
they confront the loss on their stocks, their behaviors change and go into the gambles 
– ride a losing stocks too long. The most important features of the prospect theory are 
the reference point and changes from the reference point (negative or positive 
magnitudes). 
Terrance Odean , in his paper tilted “Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their 
Losses?”, suggested some possible choices of reference point for a stock such as 
average purchase price, the highest purchase price, the first purchase price, or the 
most recent purchase price, and he found that his results doesn’t change with each 
choice. In this paper, to estimate loss, we use the average purchase price of stock as a 
reference point.  
Odean(1998) shows that investors who sell their entire holdings of a stock – 
and who are thus unlikely to be motivated by diversification- continue to prefer 
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selling winners. However, Odean could not provide the extent of loss aversion with 
respect to investors’ type – sophisticated investors or naïve investors4. This study 
provides the tendency on loss aversion by sophisticated investors. 
 
Figure [3] 
Value Functions 
 
 
 
2. Disposition Effect 
 
Many studies have extended this prospect theory into a wider theoretical 
framework concerning a general disposition to sell winners too early and hold losers 
                                            
4 Only the two files are used in his study. The trades file includes account identifier, the trade date, the 
brokerage house’s internal number for the security traded, a buy-sell indicator, the quantity traded, the 
commission paid, and the principal amount. The positions file contains monthly position information 
for the numbers. The positions file contains monthly position information for the 10,000 accounts from 
January 1988 through December 1993.  
GAINS LOSSES 
VALUE 
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too long. Hersh Shefrin and Meir Statman(1984) explained disposition effect with 
some elements – mental accounting, regret aversion, self-control, tax considerations. 
 
A.  Mental Accounting 
Mental accounting should be considered in accordance with the prospect 
theory. Recall the importance of reference point when we are discussing the 
prospect theory. When people purchased stocks, they tend to open new mental 
accounting – “segregate different types of gambles faced into separate 
accounts” – and are hesitant to readjust the reference point for a stock. Many 
investors suffer from closing the mental accounting facing the loss. Hersh 
Shefrin and Meir Statman(1984) quoted Gross’s manual for stock brokers to 
illustrate the difficulty of loss realization.  
“…Investors are also reluctant to accept and realize losses because the very 
acts of doing so proves that their first judgment was wrong...…The two 
separate transactions are made to flow together by the magic words “transfer 
your assets.” The prospect thought he was making a single decision, 
switching one investment into another. He was not being asked to think in 
terms of selling XYZ and collecting the proceeds, then having to think of 
many different ways to reinvest the proceeds…” 
 
B.  Regret Aversion and Self Control 
Another explanation of disposition effect is tendency to avoid regret and 
seek pride behavior. Investors think that realizing losses is due to their 
misjudgment so this regret leads to a disposition to realize gains and defer 
losses. 
Thaler and Shefrin(1981) explained the disposition effect by suggesting that 
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interpersonal conflicts between rational part(planner) and emotional 
part(doer) who implements the reaction with regard to regret and pride. The 
rational planner may not be strong enough to prevent the emotional reactions 
of the doer from interfering with rational decision making.  
 
Here, regret aversion and self control would not be applied to the 
sophisticated investors (institutional investors). Many professional investors use 
various techniques to resist the difficulty to realize losses and their emotional 
reactions. Shefrin and Statman(1985) illustrates the technique and its rationale in their 
paper. 
“… Professional traders often adhere to iron-clad rules that mandate the realization of 
a loss, once it reaches a predetermined percentage of the original purchase price…. 
Professionals have a hard and fast rule that they never let losses on a trade exceed ten 
percent. …. Stop-loss order provides another example. These are usually promoted as 
devices to limit risk, but their main advantages may be in allowing an investor to 
make loss realization at a predetermined point automatic…” 
Different from Odean’s result on loss aversion, we found that loss aversion is 
not the case of the foreign investors (more rational and professional investors), and 
furthermore, I study how the propensity to sell changes facing the crisis.  
 
3.  Panic Selling 
 
Panic selling is high volume selling brought about by sharp price declines. 
The main problem with panic selling is that investors are not evaluating fundamentals. 
Instead, they are selling on pure emotion.  
This paper provides the reaction to the crisis by foreign investors and shows 
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there is no panic selling among foreign investors.  
 
4.  Contrarian Strategy vs. Momentum Strategy 
 
Contrarian investing is a strategy that relies on behaving in opposition to the 
prevailing wisdom; for example, buying when others are pessimistic and selling when 
they're optimistic, or buying out-of-favor stocks. The thinking behind these moves is 
that money will eventually flow back to sectors that are currently depressed or 
ignored.  
Mark Grinblatt and Matti Keloharju(2001) interpret lacking sufficient 
controls, evidence on the disposition effect as a contrarian behavior with respect to 
past returns5. 
They found contrarian behavior is greatest for the household, government, 
and nonprofit institution investor categories. By contrast, nonfinancial corporations 
and finance and insurance institutions, domestic groups that generally are more 
sophisticated than the other three investor types, exhibit much less of this contrarian 
behavior with respect to recent stock price run-ups.  
 In Managers, Investors, and Crisis: Mutual Fund Strategies in Emerging 
Markets, authors Graciela Kaminsky, Richard Lyons, and Sergio Schmukler find 
that during crises, emerging market funds engage in "momentum trading," selling 
stocks that recently declined and buying recent winners. Contemporaneous 
momentum trading is stronger during a financial crisis, and fund investors show a 
                                            
5 Grinblatt and Keloharju use logit regression to analye separately the sell versus hold decision and the 
sell versus buy decision. They separated the data to examine the contrarian behaviors, propensity to 
loss aversion, and interaction between disposition effect and past returns with respect to each investor 
type suing the data from 1994 to 1997.  
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stronger inclination to engage in contemporaneous momentum trading than do fund 
managers.  
Kim and Wei(1999) examine the transactions of different types of portfolio 
investors in Korea before and during the Asian crisis, finding that non-resident 
institutional investors were always positive feedback traders(using momentum 
strategy), while resident investors were contrarian traders before the crisis but 
became positive feedback traders during the crisis. Choe et al(1998) also study 
transaction data from the Korean stock market during the crisis and find evidence 
for return chasing among foreign investors before the crisis period. 
In this paper, I employ the Logit regression to examine contrarian behavior of 
each investor’s type and how this contrarian behavior changes over the financial crisis 
using interaction between crisis and past returns.    
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III. Data 
 
 Main data are month-end positions on very Korean stock by every foreign 
investor from December 1996 to December 1999. Monthly transaction data of each 
stock foreign investors hold in the Korean Stock Exchange are collected.  
Foreign investors can be classified in five different groups: (1) individual 
foreign nationals who reside in Korea (henceforth “resident individuals” for short), (2) 
individual foreign nationals who invest in the Korean market from abroad (non-
resident individuals), (3) foreign institutional investors who invest from abroad (non-
resident institutions), (4) foreign institutional investors who invest inside Korea 
(resident institutions), and (5) foreign investors who are direct investors.  Note that 
individual investors are those who have opened an investment account in their own 
name with the Korean authority.  Joe Smith’s indirect investment in Korea through 
the Vanguard Asian Fund would be counted as a part of institutional investment. 
This paper focuses only on the first three groups of foreign investors.   
Resident foreign institutions are excluded because there are too few of them to make 
meaningful calculations.  Director investors are excluded since the objective of the 
paper is to uncover behavior patterns by portfolio investors (the relative tendency to 
avoiding realize losses). 
 I only observe the positions of these investors in the Korean market, but not 
their global positions.  Investors in all three groups could hold non-Korean securities.  
However, the ratio of global to Korean positions may not be the same for them.  It 
seems reasonable to assume that, on average, non-resident individuals and non-
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resident institutions are likely to have a greater share of their investment in non-
Korean securities.  
 The rest of the paper compares the three groups in terms their potentially 
different tendencies to realize losses relative to realizing gains, their strategic 
behaviors and panic selling. Table [2] shows number of observations of each investor 
type from data. 
Table [2] 
investor 
type6 number of observations percentage 
1 18,650 4.2 
2 29,845 6.72 
3 9,070 2.04 
4 22,213 5 
5 198,014 44.6 
6 77,120 17.37 
7 13,321 3 
8 384 0.09 
9 53,366 12.02 
11 10,163 2.29 
12 1,862 0.42 
13 786 0.18 
14 5,954 1.34 
15 33 0.01 
20 3,065 0.69 
                                            
6 1: non-resident individual 
2: non-resident bank 
3: non-resident insurance company 
4: non-resident securities firm (includes investment banks and brokerage firms) 
5: non-resident investment company (e.g. U.S mutual funds) 
6: non-resident investment trust company (e.g. U.K unit trusts) 
7: other institutions 
8: non-resident Koreans 
9: non-resident pension funds and endowements 
11: resident individual 
12: resident bank 
13: resident insurance company 
14: resident securities firm (includes investment banks and brokerage firms) 
15: resident other institutions 
20: direct investment 
30: others 
Non-resident institutions: 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 
Non-resident individuals: 1, 8 
Resident institutions: 12, 13, 14, 15 
Resident individuals: 11 
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30 102 0.02 
 
 
IV. Hypothesis 
 
I hypothesized four different behaviors of each three investor type. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Dispositions Effect 
There is no loss aversion among foreign investors. 
Loss aversion is only applicable to the naïve investors, otherwise, I view foreign 
investors more sophisticated investors than domestic investors and hypothesize 
loss aversion is not the case for the foreign investors.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Behavioral Reaction 
During the crisis, I examined how the propensity to sell changes when there is 
capital loss. I assumed that the propensity to sell will increase because realizing a 
loss would be no longer to be shameful (contribute the loss to the crisis, 
justifiable regret). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Panic Selling 
During the crisis, investors may blindly sell their share on the belief that share 
price will fall even further.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Contrarian Strategy 
During the crisis, contrarian behavior would exist because of the panic selling 
by naïve investors, stock prices will be excessively undervalued and this provides 
greater probability to make money by a contrarian strategist. 
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V. Methodology 
 
To capture the disposition effect, Odean(1998) calculated two ratios. 
 
 
 
The disposition effect was tested by joint test. 
The methodology Odean developed could not distinguish disposition effect 
from contrarian strategy.  
Grinblatt and Keloharju used Logit regression to distinguish the disposition 
effect from the contrarian strategy by controlling for both the stock’s patter of past 
returns and the size of the holding-period capital loss.  
This paper utilizes the Logit regression developed by Grinblatt and Keloharju 
to examine following four behaviors among foreign investors7; 1) difference between 
degrees of loss aversion among three investor types, 2) behavior reactions facing 
crisis by investors, 3) the existence of panic selling during crisis, 4) employing 
contrarian strategy or momentum strategy during the crisis by investors. 
 We determine the binary variables as a dependent variable in the regression: 
                                            
7 Grinblatt and Keloharju also analyzed loss aversion with using Logit regression, however they were 
not able to analyze foreign investors. The aim of their study is to find a evidence that investors are 
reluctant to realize losses, that they engage in tax-loss selling activity, and that past returns and 
historical price patters, such as being at a monthly high or low, affect trading. In this paper, we are 
focusing on behavioral reactions facing crisis.  
 
Realized Gains 
Realized Gains + Paper Gains 
=  Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) 
Realized Losses 
Realized Losses + Paper Losses 
=  Proportion of Losses Realized (PLR) 
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sell or do not sell. To capture each following effect, we analyzes coefficient between 
dependent variable and 52 regressors8. Using the coefficient of past returns (positive 
returns and negative returns), we can analyze investors strategy (contrarian strategy or 
momentum strategy) and with coefficients on the interactive variable between the past 
return variable and the crisis dummy, we can find the change of strategy during the 
crisis. Loss aversion can be found by coefficient on capital loss dummies. Behavioral 
reactions of investors facing during the crisis can be captured by coefficient on the 
interactive variable between crisis dummy and capital loss dummy. Lastly, panic 
selling will be captured by crisis dummy. I defined crisis period from November 1997 
to December 1997.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
8 See Appendix 
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VI. Empirical Study 
 
1. Does Disposition Effect exist? 
 
The disposition effect, the tendency to hold losers too long and sell winners 
too soon, has been tested by Odean in the method of joint test of PGR(Proportion of 
Gains Realized) and PLR(Proportion of Losses Realized) as I explained early. 
Odean(1998) concluded that investors realize their profitable stocks investments at a 
much higher rate than their unprofitable ones. Grinblatt and Keloharju also found 
disposition by four investor categories. 
 I used capital loss dummy9 as an indicator of loss aversion (disposition 
effect) and Table [3] shows there is no loss aversion for the foreign investors of Korea 
Stock Exchange. Among three investor types, non-resident individuals show the most 
propensities to sell when there is capital loss. Non-resident individual are 
0.17(calculated by 0.6667/410) less likely to sell stocks with capital loss. In the case of 
non-resident institutions and resident individuals, capital loss makes a sale 0.039 and 
0.07 each less likely than a capital gain. As I mentioned early, foreign investors seem 
to be more sophisticated and rational than domestic investors11 so that they do not 
show any loss aversion. 
 
 
 
                                            
9 Capital loss dummy is 1 if there is capital loss and zero otherwise. Capital loss is calculated by 
purchasing price minus month-end price of stock. Here, reference price is average purchasing price.  
10 Assessing economic significans by noting that each regression coefficient is four times the 
regressor’s marginal impact on the probability of selling a stock for regressor values that make the 
propensity to sell 1/2. 
11 Odean(1998) and Grinblatt and Keloharju(2001) analyzed domestic investors. 
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Table [3] 
Independent variable Non-resident institutions 
Non-resident 
individuals 
Resident 
individuals 
Capital loss dummy  
0.1560 0.6664 0.2829 Capital loss dummy 
(14.87) (14.97) (3.6) 
( ): z-value 
 
2. Are there Behavioral Reactions facing crisis? 
 
 Behavioral reactions against crisis can be captured by interaction between 
capital loss dummy and crisis dummy. Table [4] shows crisis makes investors more 
likely to sell stocks with capital loss. For example, the coefficient of capital loss 
dummy is 0.1560 for the non-resident institutions and this coefficient changes to 
1.0685 (0.9125 + 0.1560) during the crisis, which means that the propensity to sell 
increase by 0.228 comparing with no-crisis period. This implies capital loss of 
investor’s portfolio can be attributable to financial environment (crisis) not to their 
investment decision; therefore, there is no need to avoid regret and seek pride. 
Moreover, foreign investors already let their planners (rational part) implement their 
plans do not give any chance to doers (emotional part).  
 
Table [4] 
Independent variable Non-resident institutions 
Non-resident 
individuals 
Resident 
individuals 
Interaction between capital loss dummy and crisis dummy 
0.9125 1.7010 2.3441 Capital loss dummy ⅹ 
Crisis dummy (12.62) (3.37) (4.16) 
( ): z-value 
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3. Does a Panic Selling occur by foreign investors? 
 
 Panic selling among the foreign investors does not occur during financial 
crisis. As you can see in Table [5], the coefficients of crisis dummy for all three 
investor categories shows negative values which implies no panic selling during crisis.  
Figure [4] shows net amount of purchase (amount of purchase - amount of sell) by 
foreign investors from 1997 to 2000, and if we see the crisis period (November 1997 
and December 1997), we cannot conclude there is panic selling compared with other 
period(In October 1999 and October 2000, there is less net purchasing amount than 
financial crisis period. ) Figure [5] also shows no panic selling.  
 
Table [5] 
Independent variable Non-resident institutions 
Non-resident 
individuals 
Resident 
individuals 
Crisis dummy 
-0.3976 -1.8126 -0.6831 Crisis dummy (-3.31) (-1.84) (-0.72) 
( ): z-value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23
Figure [4] 
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Figure [5] 
Proportion of sale to buy 
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4. Do foreign investors employ the Contrarian Strategy? 
 
 Table [6] shows the degree of propensity to sell with respect to past positive 
and negative returns. The data has only month-end position of the investors; we can 
calculate the past market adjusted returns on the monthly basis.  
With coefficient on past market adjusted returns, we can analyze whether 
each investor category has a contrarian strategy or momentum strategy. Statistical 
result shows that there is particular strategy among the investors during the non-crisis 
period. In the case of non-resident institutions, positive and negative market adjusted 
returns affect selling decision significantly, however, for both non-resident and 
resident individuals; their propensity to sell is not affected by past returns significantly. 
 On the other hand, during the crisis period, non-resident institutions 
employed momentum strategy. For example, for the non-crisis period, the -0.2347 
coefficient of current return makes the propensity to sell 0.06 lower and for the crisis 
period, the degree of less propensity to sell increase by 0.135 (calculated by (-0.2347 
– 0.3053) /4). In other words, positive past returns make lower the propensity to sell 
for both period. In the case of negative return, the coefficient of negative past returns 
during non-crisis period is -0.43 which doesn’t make the propensity to sell less likely. 
However, during the crisis period, the coefficient of negative past returns on the 
propensity to sell changes to 0.105(-0.43 + 0.5351) which means that negative past 
returns increase the propensity to sell by 0.026. Therefore, the momentum strategy is 
utilized by non-resident institutions during the crisis. This result is consistent with the 
conclusion by Choe et al. (1999) reporting that foreign investors exhibit momentum 
strategy. However, they couldn’t categorize foreign investors into institutions and 
individuals. In this paper, we found that momentum strategy was adopted by non-
resident foreign institutions and there is no specific strategy done by foreign 
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individuals12.  
 The past returns variables are more important for the non-resident institutions 
and resident individuals than capital loss dummy. Excluding past returns makes 
pseudo-R2 lower from 0.0317 to 0.0290 for the non-resident institutions and from 
0.0558 to 0.035 for the resident-individuals and pseudo-R2 is 0.0303 with excluding 
capital loss dummy for the non-resident institutions and 0.0485 for the resident-
individuals. On the other hand, for the non-resident individuals, capital loss was more 
important decision variable than past returns. 
 
Table [6] 
Independent variable Non-resident institutions 
Non-resident 
individuals 
Resident 
individuals 
Positive returns 
Current -0.2347 (-6.07) 
0.0086 
(0.08) 
0.1103 
(0.94) 
One month prior 0.5795 (10.73) 
-0.0720 
(-0.37) 
-0.8666 
(-2.49) 
Two month prior -0.4097 (-6.85) 
-0.3611 
(-1.47) 
0.1870 
(0.43) 
Three month prior 0.1932 (3.63) 
0.4007 
(1.79) 
0.3972 
(0.99) 
4month to 6 month 
prior 
0.0469 
(4.31) 
-0.0521 
(-1.78) 
-0.0618 
(-1.22) 
7month to 9month 
prior 
0.0707 
(6.23) 
0.0884 
(2.79) 
-0.1233 
(-1.76) 
10 month to 12 
month prior 
0.0240 
(1.85) 
-0.0471 
(-1.24) 
-0.0970 
(-1.3) 
( ): z-value 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
12 Their coefficients of past negative returns are not significant. See Table [ ] 
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Table [7] 
Independent 
variable 
Non-resident 
institutions 
Non-resident 
individuals 
Resident 
individuals 
Negative returns 
-0.4301 1.0157 1.4144 Current (-7.61) (5.17) (3.77) 
0.1113 0.4359 0.4311 One month prior (1.79) (1.76) (1.05) 
-0.6100 -0.3069 0.4909 Two month prior (-12.7) (-1.47) (1.48) 
0.0505 0.1461 0.3761 Three month prior (1.27) (0.85) (1.27) 
0.2434 0.1368 0.2636 4month to 6 month 
prior (8.07) (1.35) (1.51) 
0.1819 0.0851 0.0268 7month to 9month 
prior (5.3) (0.81) (0.14) 
0.1996 0.1742 0.8306 10 month to 12 
month prior (5.21) (1.45) (3.45) 
( ): z-value 
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Table [8] 
Independent variable Non-resident institutions 
Non-resident 
individuals Resident individuals
Interaction between Crisis dummy and Positive returns 
-0.3053 1.7903 6.3068 Current (-1.96) (-1.07) -3.29 
0.4627 -3.5567 0.4208 One month prior  (1.42) (-1.18) (0.16) 
-1.6844 -0.4053 -3.7795 Two month prior  (-6.81) (-0.19) (-1.59) 
0.2583 -0.5351 -3.7660 4month to 6month 
prior (1.92) (-0.53) (-2.66) 
-0.2041 -0.0346 -0.6028 7month to 9month 
prior  (-1.61) (-0.05) (-0.89) 
0.4503 1.4745 1.8509 10month to 12month 
prior (2.96) (1.32) (1.63) 
Interaction between Crisis dummy and Negative returns 
0.5351 -0.4447 -2.8327 Current (2.77) (-0.28) (-2.69) 
-0.3346 2.2898 1.3922 One month prior  (-0.58) (0.55) (0.33) 
-0.0935 -0.3926 -3.4465 Two month prior  (-0.16) (-0.09) (-0.8) 
0.7727 0.4839 4.0526 Three month prior  (0.9) (0.07) (0.59) 
-1.5767 -3.2723 0.6530 4month to 6month 
prior (-5.84) (-1.77) (0.42) 
0.4594 -3.0671 -1.0135 7month to 9month 
prior  (1.75) (-1.19) (-0.51) 
-0.8018 2.0587 2.6556 10month to 12month 
prior (-2.4) (0.75) (1.43) 
( ): z-value 
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5. Other factors affecting the selling decision 
 
 Portfolio size, average volatility of the stock, minimum price and maximum 
price also affect selling decision by investors significantly; all of these variables z-
value is higher enough to confirm their significance. For example, if a current price of 
the stock is higher than maximum price of the stock over 1 year period, all three 
investors tends to sell.  
 
Table [9] 
Independent variable Non-resident institutions 
Non-resident 
individuals 
Resident 
individuals 
Other factors to affect the propensity to sell  
-0.1860 -0.0547 -0.1313 Ln(Value of Portfolio) (-81.66) (-5.14) (-6.56) 
38.3189 -1.5668 50.8700 Mean Volatility (9.91) (-0.12) (2.36) 
0.0506 -0.2413 -0.2717 Sell price < min price over 1 year (3.45) (-3.56) (-2.55) 
0.2367 0.4099 0.5221 Sell price < max price over 1 year (16.9) (7.18) (4.95) 
0.0243 -0.0199 -0.0400 horizon (30.07) (-4.52) (-6.55) 
( ): z-value 
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VII. Conclusion 
This paper examines factors which affect their selling decision. As many 
paper studied disposition effect of investors, this paper also studies disposition effect, 
however, the disposition effect is not found among foreign resident and non-resident 
investors; furthermore, investors facing crisis more actively sell stocks with capital 
loss than when they do not face crisis. Moreover, no evidence of panic selling of 
foreign investors is found during financial crisis. Lastly, no specific strategy of 
resident and non-resident individuals exists and momentum strategy is done by non-
resident institutions during crisis.  
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Appendix 
 
Dependent Variable: 1 if sell, 0 otherwise 
(Non-resident Institutions) 
Independent variables Coefficient Standard Error Z value p-value 
Positive market returns [0] -0.2347 0.0387 -6.07 0 
Positive market returns [1] 0.5795 0.0540 10.73 0 
Positive market returns [2] -0.4097 0.0598 -6.85 0 
Positive market returns [3] 0.1932 0.0532 3.63 0 
Positive market returns [4,6] 0.0469 0.0109 4.31 0 
Positive market returns [7,9] 0.0707 0.0113 6.23 0 
Positive market returns [10,11] 0.0240 0.0130 1.85 0.065 
Negative market returns [0] -0.4301 0.0565 -7.61 0 
Negative market returns [1] 0.1113 0.0623 1.79 0.074 
Negative market returns [2] -0.6100 0.0480 -12.7 0 
Negative market returns [3] 0.0505 0.0397 1.27 0.204 
Negative market returns [4,6] 0.2434 0.0301 8.07 0 
Negative market returns [7,9] 0.1819 0.0343 5.3 0 
Negative market returns [10,11] 0.1996 0.0383 5.21 0 
       Capital Loss Dummy 0.1560 0.0105 14.87 0 
      Crisis Dummy -0.3976 0.1200 -3.31 0.001 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[0] -0.3053 0.1561 -1.96 0.05 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[1] 0.4627 0.3270 1.42 0.157 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[2] -1.6844 0.2474 -6.81 0 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[4,6] 0.2583 0.1345 1.92 0.055 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[7,9] -0.2041 0.1270 -1.61 0.108 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[10,12] 0.4503 0.1519 2.96 0.003 
Crisis ⅹ Negative market returns[0] 0.5351 0.1932 2.77 0.006 
Crisis ⅹ Negative market returns[1] -0.3346 0.5765 -0.58 0.562 
Crisis ⅹ Negative market returns[2] -0.0935 0.5814 -0.16 0.872 
Crisis ⅹ Negative market returns[3] 0.7727 0.8551 0.9 0.366 
Crisis ⅹ Negative market returns[4,6] -1.5767 0.2701 -5.84 0 
Crisis ⅹ Negative market returns[7,9] 0.4594 0.2621 1.75 0.08 
Crisis ⅹ Negative market returns[10,12] -0.8018 0.3343 -2.4 0.016 
Crisis ⅹCapital Loss Dummy 0.9125 0.0723 12.62 0 
Ln(Portfolio) -0.1860 0.0023 -81.66 0 
Mean Volatility 38.3189 3.8655 9.91 0 
Price < Min Price 0.0506 0.0146 3.45 0.001 
Price > Max Price 0.2367 0.0140 16.9 0 
horizon 0.0243 0.0008 30.07 0 
bank 0.0661 0.0285 2.32 0.02 
Insurance Company -0.1137 0.0373 -3.05 0.002 
Securities Company 0.2394 0.0304 7.86 0 
Mutual Funds 0.1091 0.0246 4.43 0 
Trust Company 0.0559 0.0257 2.18 0.029 
Pension Funds -0.0849 0.0269 -3.15 0.002 
February -0.0297 0.0274 -1.08 0.279 
March -0.1035 0.0282 -3.67 0 
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April 0.0375 0.0261 1.44 0.151 
May 0.1407 0.0253 5.56 0 
June -0.0080 0.0260 -0.31 0.758 
July 0.3450 0.0244 14.17 0 
August 0.0829 0.0250 3.32 0.001 
September 0.0073 0.0254 0.29 0.772 
October 0.1264 0.0245 5.16 0 
November 0.1523 0.0257 5.93 0 
December -0.0331 0.0262 -1.26 0.206 
Number of observations: 306827 
Pseudo-R2: 0.0317 
 
(Non-resident individuals) 
Independent variables Coefficient Standard Error Z value p-value 
Positive market returns [0] 0.0086 0.1127 0.08 0.939 
Positive market returns [1] -0.0720 0.1943 -0.37 0.711 
Positive market returns [2] -0.3611 0.2454 -1.47 0.141 
Positive market returns [3] 0.4007 0.2245 1.79 0.074 
Positive market returns [4,6] -0.0521 0.0293 -1.78 0.075 
Positive market returns [7,9] 0.0884 0.0316 2.79 0.005 
Positive market returns [10,11] -0.0471 0.0380 -1.24 0.215 
Negative market returns [0] 1.0157 0.1965 5.17 0 
Negative market returns [1] 0.4359 0.2473 1.76 0.078 
Negative market returns [2] -0.3069 0.2084 -1.47 0.141 
Negative market returns [3] 0.1461 0.1717 0.85 0.395 
Negative market returns [4,6] 0.1368 0.1013 1.35 0.177 
Negative market returns [7,9] 0.0851 0.1054 0.81 0.42 
Negative market returns [10,11] 0.1742 0.1199 1.45 0.146 
       Capital Loss Dummy 0.6664 0.0445 14.97 0 
      Crisis Dummy -1.8126 0.9850 -1.84 0.066 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[0] 1.7903 1.6788 1.07 0.286 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[1] -3.5567 3.0151 -1.18 0.238 
Crisis ⅹ Positive market returns[2] -0.4053 2.0823 -0.19 0.846 
Crisis  Positive market returns[4,6]ⅹ  -0.5351 1.0016 -0.53 0.593 
Crisis  Positive market returns[7,9]ⅹ  -0.0346 0.7018 -0.05 0.961 
Crisis  Positive market returns[10,12]ⅹ  1.4745 1.1183 1.32 0.187 
Crisis  Negative marⅹ ket returns[0] -0.4447 1.5727 -0.28 0.777 
Crisis  Negative market returns[1]ⅹ  2.2898 4.1287 0.55 0.579 
Crisis  Negative market returns[2]ⅹ  -0.3926 4.5289 -0.09 0.931 
Crisis  Negative market returns[3]ⅹ  0.4839 6.9648 0.07 0.945 
Crisis  Negative market ⅹ returns[4,6] -3.2723 1.8484 -1.77 0.077 
Crisis  Negative market returns[7,9]ⅹ  -3.0671 2.5826 -1.19 0.235 
Crisis  Negative market returns[10,12]ⅹ  2.0587 2.7623 0.75 0.456 
Crisis Capital Loss Dummyⅹ  1.7010 0.5053 3.37 0.001 
Ln(Portfolio) -0.0547 0.0106 -5.14 0 
Mean Volatility -1.5668 12.6896 -0.12 0.902 
Price < Min Price -0.2413 0.0678 -3.56 0 
Price > Max Price 0.4099 0.0571 7.18 0 
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horizon -0.0199 0.0044 -4.52 0 
February -0.3603 0.1187 -3.04 0.002 
March -0.3405 0.1189 -2.86 0.004 
April -0.0695 0.1043 -0.67 0.505 
May -0.2278 0.1146 -1.99 0.047 
June -0.2217 0.1104 -2.01 0.045 
July 0.0115 0.0991 0.12 0.908 
August -0.2815 0.1091 -2.58 0.01 
September -0.4435 0.1091 -4.06 0 
October -0.3371 0.1034 -3.26 0.001 
November 0.1977 0.0973 2.03 0.042 
December 0.0748 0.1078 0.69 0.488 
Number of observations: 13712 
Pseudo-R2: 0.0244 
 
(Non-resident individuals) 
Independent variables Coefficient Standard Error Z value p-value 
Positive market returns [0] 0.1103 0.1180 0.94 0.35
Positive market returns [1] -0.8666 0.3475 -2.49 0.013
Positive market returns [2] 0.1870 0.4326 0.43 0.666
Positive market returns [3] 0.3972 0.4015 0.99 0.323
Positive market returns [4,6] -0.0618 0.0507 -1.22 0.223
Positive market returns [7,9] -0.1233 0.0702 -1.76 0.079
Positive market returns [10,11] -0.0970 0.0749 -1.3 0.195
Negative market returns [0] 1.4144 0.3748 3.77 0
Negative market returns [1] 0.4311 0.4094 1.05 0.292
Negative market returns [2] 0.4909 0.3308 1.48 0.138
Negative market returns [3] 0.3761 0.2953 1.27 0.203
Negative market returns [4,6] 0.2636 0.1749 1.51 0.132
Negative market returns [7,9] 0.0268 0.1900 0.14 0.888
Negative market returns [10,11] 0.8306 0.2411 3.45 0.001
       Capital Loss Dummy 0.2829 0.0787 3.6 0
      Crisis Dummy -0.6831 0.9532 -0.72 0.474
Crisis  Positive market returns[0]ⅹ  6.3068 1.9169 3.29 0.001
Crisis  Positive market returns[1]ⅹ  0.4208 2.6447 0.16 0.874
Crisis  Positive market returns[2]ⅹ  -3.7795 2.3745 -1.59 0.111
Crisis  Positⅹ ive market returns[4,6] -3.7660 1.4171 -2.66 0.008
Crisis  Positive market returns[7,9]ⅹ  -0.6028 0.6795 -0.89 0.375
Crisis  Positive market returns[10,12]ⅹ  1.8509 1.1382 1.63 0.104
Crisis  Negative market returns[0]ⅹ  -2.8327 1.0531 -2.69 0.007
Crisis  Negative market returns[1]ⅹ  1.3922 4.1570 0.33 0.738
Crisis  Negative market returns[2]ⅹ  -3.4465 4.3250 -0.8 0.426
Crisis  Negative market returns[3]ⅹ  4.0526 6.8919 0.59 0.557
Crisis  Negative market returns[4,6]ⅹ  0.6530 1.5675 0.42 0.677
Crisis  Negative market returns[7,9]ⅹ  -1.0135 1.9758 -0.51 0.608
Crisis  Negative market returns[10,12]ⅹ  2.6556 1.8608 1.43 0.154
Crisis Capital Loss Dummyⅹ  2.3441 0.5637 4.16 0
Ln(Portfolio) -0.1313 0.0200 -6.56 0
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Mean Volatility 50.8700 21.5491 2.36 0.018
Price < Min Price -0.2717 0.1067 -2.55 0.011
Price > Max Price 0.5221 0.1054 4.95 0
horizon -0.0400 0.0061 -6.55 0
February -0.2722 0.1952 -1.39 0.163
March 0.4407 0.1836 2.4 0.016
April 0.6060 0.1655 3.66 0
May 0.6380 0.1762 3.62 0
June 0.6801 0.1778 3.82 0
July 0.3024 0.1688 1.79 0.073
August 0.2411 0.1826 1.32 0.187
September 0.1078 0.1969 0.55 0.584
October 0.3151 0.1847 1.71 0.088
November 0.4568 0.1883 2.43 0.015
December 0.6492 0.1976 3.28 0.001
Number of observations: 5252 
Pseudo-R2: 0.0558 
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